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S A D C C :
TOWARD REGIONAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT
We believe there is room for 
substantial increases in trade among 
ourselves. To this end existing
payment systems and customs
instruments will be studied in order 
to build up a regional trade system 
based on bilaterally negotiated annual 
trade targets and product lists.
- Lusaka Declaration
SADCC Secretariat 
December, 1983
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S A D C C : TOWARD REGIONAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT
I . Economic Coordination and Trade
1. Trade is not the goal of regional economic coordination.
The goals of economic coordination in Southern Africa - as set 
out in the Lusaka Declaration - centre on production, employment 
and economic s e c u r i t y . Trade is not an end in itself but a means 
to achieving certain economic ends, or to achieving them at a 
lower cost.
2. To assume that expanding trade is the purpose of economic 
coordination is one of the two basic errors of the standard free 
trade area approach to economic integration. States are less 
concerned with trade as such than with material production, 
employment and economic security. The second error is to argue 
for an unregulated, free market approach to regional trade when, 
in fact, all the participating governments practice economic 
internventionism (even if to varying degrees) nationally. To 
attempt to have unregulated regional trade makes it difficult for 
states to act to ensure that trade does in fact promote 
production, employment and economic security in each 
participating state. Further, regionally as well as nationally, 
free markets (as opposed to managed markets) are inconsistent 
with ensuring an acceptable division of gains and costs. If they 
are not, then progressive income taxes, profits taxes, price 
controls, wage regulation and much other national economic 
legislation would be rather pointless. Therefore in an
2unregulated free trade area or common market the unregulated, 
free market logic of the regional integrataion body is directly 
in conflict with the interventionist logic and practice of the 
national member states and is enevitably eroded or broken by 
them.
3. These basic facts - that production, employment and economic 
security come first with trade as a means and that equitable 
regional coordination must be decided on and managed by the 
member states - are embodied in the Lusaka Declaration. That the 
Declaration's authors were correct is demonstrataed by the simple 
fact that SADCC has made substantial and rapid progress over its 
three years of existence even though it has not yet acted in the 
field of facilitating or coordinating regional trade in goods.
4. However, that is not to say that trade is unimportant 
nationally or regionally. Nor is it to argue that facilitation 
and development of regional trade should remain peripheral to 
SADCC activities. As each member state knows, international 
trade is important as a means to realising the value of goods 
p r o d u c e d , to securing critical inputs into production, 
consumption and investment, to creating employment and to having 
the products - e.g. food and fuel - essential to economic 
s ecurity. Similarly the Lusaka Declaration clearly sets out 
regional trade as a topic to figure in S A D C C 1s Programme of 
Action and suggests certain approaches to it, including frame 
trade agreements.
5. Indeed in one respect SADCC has proomoted trade - trade in
3services. While termed "invisibles", payments and receipts for 
transport services are quite as real as those for "visible" 
imports and exports of goods. Regional transport routes, after 
all, make little sense unless they carry inter-state traffic and 
cannot continue operating unless that traffic is paid for.
6. Realisation of the value of present and proposed production 
of Angolan oil, Batswana coal, Tanzanian ammonia and urea, 
Zimbabwean maize, Mozambican hydroelectric power, Swazi pulp and 
paper depend significantly on trade and, at least to a degree, on 
the enhanced development of intra-SADCC trade. Similarly food 
and energy security on a regional basis require the movement of 
grain, petroleum and hydro-electric power between and among SADCC 
states, i.e. trade as well as production.
7. To date explicit discussion of trade development in SADCC 
has taken place in the context of official and ministerial 
meetings on Industrial C o o r d i n a t i o n . It has related to enhanced 
utilisation of existing capacity and to ensuring viability for 
coordinated expansion of national capacities.
8. Several SADCC States have underutilised manufacturing 
capacity for basic consumer goods and intermediate goods which 
other SADCC states currently import from outside the region (in 
certain cases from South A f r i c a ) . If that capacity could be 
utilised to produce for export within the r e g i o n , there evidently 
would be an increase in production, employment and export 
earnings on the part of the member states prodcuing the products. 
Because only a fraction of the value of these manufactures would
4represent import content, there would be a net reduction of 
regional imports from the outside w o r l d . Further, dependence on 
South Arica could, at least marginally, be reduced.
9. Somewhat similar considerations apply in respect to 
coordinated expansion of national manufacturing sectors.
Regional markets range from useful through important to critical 
for a substantial number of potential plants. This is 
especially true for the three smallest SADCC members whose 
national markets are too small to absorb the output of plants 
which could quite easily market their whole output nationally in 
one of the economically larger members. Sustained regional 
industrial expansion - especially in respect to complex consumer 
products, intermediate goods and capital goods including 
ocnstruction inputs, and also especially in respect to the 
smaller member economies - does depend significantly on market 
expansion by trade including regional trade.
10. However, as noted above, trade within SADCC is not limited 
to manufactured g o o d s . It encompasses:
(a) services (especially transport);
(b) fuel and energy (especially crude oil, coal, 
petroleum products and hydro-electric p o w e r ) ;
(c) food and other agricultural, animal, forestry and 
fishery products;
(d) manufactured goods (and inputs into 
manufacturing).
11. These arguments are by no means new. The desirability of
5greater trade between and among SADCC states has been recognised 
from well before S A D C C 1s formal creation. There are quite real 
obstacles to achieving it. These obstacles will be reviewed in 
the fourth section of this paper - and ways toward reducing them 
in the fifth - following a review of the sub-sectoral 
possibilities for trade set out above and a sketch of the case 
for a broad approach to trade development rather than one limited 
to one category of products (e.g. manufactures) or one instrument 
(e.g. tariff or exchange control reduction) of promoting trade.
61 1 . Trade in Transport, Energy, Agriculture, Industry
12. Trade in transport is, almost by definition, significant 
within SADCC:
(a) five of the six landlocked states use transport 
services purchased from the three coastal and (as 
intermediate transit corridor participants) two 
of the land-locked members;
(b) for two of the coastal states "invisible" export 
earnings on transit traffic are significant and 
for Angola they will become so when the end of 
the South African backed insurrection makes 
restoration of normal traffic possible;
(c) the independence of Namibia will increase the 
potential for transport trade with SADCC by
providing direct access to an Atlantic port which
is particularly important for Botswana and
Zimbabwe (and especially for their development of 
steam coal exports to E u r o p e ) ;
(d) to a significant extent use of ADCC transport 
routes is a direct substitute for use of South 
African, thereby reducing dependence on RSA and 
reducing total "invisible imports" of the region 
taken as a whole.
13. Transport has not usually been seen in terms of trade as
opposed to production (providing routes, increasing efficiency of
op e ration). This is partly a matter of accounting conventions - 
transport revenues and payments are called "invisibles" rather
7than "visible trade" in Balance of Payments. In addition they 
are not subject to export or import duties. At least equally 
critically one cannot substitute transport routes with the same 
ease as one can sources of manufactured goods - the only 
alternative to SADCC routes (and transport trade) for most 
members is RSA routes, dependence on which they are seeking to 
reduce.
14. However, trade is relevant to transport as well as to other 
se c t o r s :
(a) the viability of inter-state routes depends 
substantially on "export earnings" from transit 
cargo;
(b) delays in payments for transport have serious 
repercussions of efficiency of route operation 
and maintenance just as delays in payments for 
goods effect the viability of producers, 
exporters, bankers;
(c) a large negative balance in trade in transport (a 
structural characteristic of land-locked states) 
does limit their capacity to run a negative 
visible trade balance with their coastal 
neighbours - more positively it increases the 
importance to them of regional market development 
in respect to goods which they can export to 
their coastal neighbours.
15. Trade in energy is essential if Regional Energy Security is 
to be effective;
8(a) as a region SADCC is a net exporter of crude oil, 
coal and hydro-electric power;
(b) however, eight states import crude oil and/or 
petroleum products (basically from outside the 
region) while three are dependent on power 
imports from South Africa;
(c) low cost energy development (and reduction of 
dependence on South African sources) cannot be 
based totally on domestic production; especially 
because only one member has, as yet, discovered 
exploitable oil reserves.
16. In respect to petroleum and p roducts, trade is possible - 
often with a cost saving. Given the present state of the 
petroleum market, it could be useful to Angola to develop 
additional assured markets within the SADCC region. Similarly - 
especially for the states partly or wholly dependent on South 
African sources for refined products - additional refinery 
capacity would increase economic security and reduce foreign 
exchange cost (and cost of products in general compared with 
South African supplies). Again trade is required because only 
five states have adequate market size to justify a refinery. The 
key potential refined products sources would be Mozambique 
(especially to Botswana) and Angola (on the independence of 
Namibia to Namibia, and on the completion of the Trans-Kalahari 
to B o t s w a n a ) .
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17. Hydroelectric and coal fired thermal capacity development 
among the central five SADCC states (Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
Mozambique, Swaziland) can be developed more efficiently (in both 
capital and recurrent cost terms) if there is inter-state trade 
in electric p o w e r . In some cases this may involve cross imports 
and exports to and from different parts of a country. For 
Botswana and Swaziland such trade is particularly crucial. Their 
options are growing dependence on imports from South Africa; very 
high cost national thermal units of sub-optional size; imports 
from Mozambique and Zimbabwe or optimal sized coal-fired thermal 
plants with export contracts to their neighbours. For Mozambique 
developing an export trade in power to SADCC states could 
significantly reduce Cahora Bassa's dependence on the South 
African market. For Zimbabwe power imports from SADCC states 
could reduce the very high capital bill for large scale thermal 
plants and might facilitate exports of manufactured goods as part 
of a package trade agreement combined with power import 
c o n tracts.
18 Agriculture has been approached by SADCC primarily in terms 
of regional food security. However, security based on surplus 
production and reserve stocks in one or more member states can
only be effective if trade in agricultural products on a
commercial basis - as well as by externally financed food aid
programmes - is built up.
19. Agricultural trade potential is wider than grain and 
potential suppliers are not limited to Zimbabwe. In good weather 
years both Zambia and Tanzania have maize surpluses. There are
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patterns of both fish and meat imports by some members and 
exports by others, but very little regional trade. Vegetable oil 
is another possible area of trade as are root crops (potatoes and 
cassava, the latter probably as cattle feed) and coarse grains 
(either for drought relief or as cattle or poultry fe e d ) .
20. For some of the smaller states development of production and 
processing of certain crops is likely to depend on acquiring 
absolutely small but relatively critical export markets in their 
neighbours. A possible example is oil seed and vegetable oil 
production in Swaziland.
21. Trade in manufactures has received more study within SADCC. 
The Industrial Coordination work has identified 75 significant 
products for which there is (or soon will be) exportable 
surpluses or capacity to produce them in one or more states and 
imports from third countries by other SADCC members.
22. Further, the evolving regional strategy for coordinated 
development does assume trade to realise economies of scale and 
coordination. This is true in respect to its two more 
articulated foci of industrial inputs into agricultural 
production and basic consumer goods. It appears likely to be 
even more significant as articulation of products and product 
groups proceeds with respect to capital goods.
23. The limited trade now taking place in the region does 
consist, to a significant extent, of manufactures. Several of 
the trade agreements among pairs of member states have also
11
concentrated on such products. However, it is unfortunately true 
that the development of even this branch of trade is not 
proceeding rapidly or s m oothly. There have even been one or more 
cases of special restrictions on certain manufactured imports 
from a fellow SADCC member state.
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I I I . The Need for an Overall Approach
24. Trade development in SADCC can be facilitated by approaching 
it from a broad per s p e c t i v e . Attention should not be focused on 
separate sub-sectors of trade - notably transport, energy, 
agriculture, manufactures - but should also look at overall 
intercountry and intra-regional trade encompassing both 
"visibles" and "invisibles".
25. This is not to suggest that there is no scope - or indeed 
need - for special arrangements. In the cases of some 
manufactures, grain, crude oil, electric power and perhaps others 
term contracts relating to a specific product may be critical. 
These could cover multi year commitments to buy and to supply
initial year prices and subsequent year price adjustment
),
formulae. However, trade relations built up only by such 
contracts are apt to remain rather limited in terms of coverage 
and to be in danger of erosion if the balance of overall imports 
and exports is very unequal. It is at the overall level, not the 
specific product or sectoral, that intervention to achieve net 
gains in output and employment in each trading partner is most 
likely to be effective and especially to be effective through 
increasing trade to achieve mutual gains at a higher level not 
decreasing trade to reduce perceived inequality of division of 
gains by making the overall gains smaller.
26. This approach requires an interventionist rather than a free 
trade stance. (Since none of S A D C C 's members practices free 
trade, without intervention or tariffs or import licensing in
13
general, managed trade development within SADCC should pose no 
problem of principle.) Perceived gains by all participants are 
necessary to maintain the perceived common interest in trade 
development; the operating principle in which SADCC is based in 
each programme area.
27. The particular methods of intervention can - and will - vary 
from state to state and time to t i m e . Public enterprise (state) 
trading and detailed import licensing are by no means essential 
to promotion of regional trade (indeed in respect to transport 
and power they are rather irrelevant). However, they can be used 
as instruments to enhance regional trade and probably should be 
so used by the majority of SADCC states using detailed import 
licensing and/or with substantial public sector participation in 
exports and imports.
28. SADCC has deliberately followed a mixed approach to 
programme development. Regional decisions on frameworks and 
general measures have been linked with dominantly national or 
bilateral implementation. Trade development seems likely to fit 
into this pattern. A number of steps which could be taken by all 
SADCC members, acting on a coordinated basis, to create a 
framework conducive to regional trade development are identified 
in the concluding section of this paper. However, at least 
initially, actual agreements on trade targets and specific 
measures to attain them will almost certainly need to be pursued 
primarily bilaterally rather than multilaterally.
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IV. Present Barriers to Trade Development
29. The main barriers to trade development are discussed in 
fairly general terms below. How critical they are varies from 
sector to sector and from state to state. However, none is 
totally irrelevant to any sector nor totally absent in any SADCC 
m e m b e r .
30. Knowledge of what goods (and services) are available, where, 
who sells them, how to order and when delivery could be expected 
is exceedingly p o o r . This is truer at the level of import/export 
firms than of officials and of producers/users than of 
import/export houses. With rare exceptions both officials and 
enterprises know what is available at what cost, how and when 
from outside states in much more detail than they know in respect 
to fellow SADCC members. Both information sought (as to sources 
or markets) and sent out (as to desires to buy or to sell) is 
concentrated on traditional markets and sources of supply outside 
the re g i o n , and on traditional exports which are not necessarily 
those most relevant to regional trade development. There are 
certain exceptions - e.g between Botswana and Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique and Tanzania - but, in general, this external 
orientation of knowledge remains dominant. It is a major barrier 
to trade development - unknown goods are , by definition, not 
ordered and unknown customers not c a nvassed.
31. An inferiority complex exists in respect to many national 
and regional products. Not merely is there a preference for 
known brand or producer names but also for products imported from
15
industrial eco n o m i e s . The initial reasons for this attitude are 
understandable: a known, reliable brand name is some guarantee of 
a product's nature; a product from an industrial economy usually 
(not always) is reasonably suitable; some local (and initial 
import purchase) products have proven to be inferior. However, 
the general attitude to domestic and regional products often goes 
well beyond what is reasonable. Many SADCC products are of high 
quality by world standards, e.g. Botswana foot and mouth vaccine, 
Tanzanian instant coffee. Many others are adequate basic 
products which are more suitable to meeting basic needs for food, 
clothing, shelter or cleaning at prices within SADCC state 
consumers' ability to pay than higher quality, but also costlier, 
imports, e.g. several countries soap, textiles and shoes, 
Zimbabwean iron and steel products, some Zambian mining industry 
s upplies.
32. Transport and supporting services are in many cases less 
adequate within SADCC than between its members and outside 
countries. This does not apply simply to road, rail, air and 
coastal ship transport. It also pertains - though to a 
decreasing extent - to communications. Commercial knowledge does 
depend on rapid, reliable communication by post as well as 
telecommunication. Further, even when physical transport 
facilities and communications are adequate associated services - 
e.g. shipping agents, clearers and forwarders, insurance agents - 
policies - claims adjusters/inspectors - are often weak or even 
a b s e n t .
33. Regional products are believed (often correctly) to cost
16
more. This is less true of services (although South Africa 
appears to subsidise transport rates in some cases), electricity 
and energy and but is especially so in respect of manufactured 
goods. In certain cases the extra cost is the result not of 
production but of transport, e.g. maize ex-Zimbabwe may be as 
cheap or cheaper than ex-Chicago but freight from Harare to Dar 
es Salaam or Luanda (though not to Gaborone, Mbabane, Maputo or 
Lusaka) is higher than from Chicago. However, to the importer 
the point is that the C.I.F. price _is higher, not whether this is 
caused by higher ex-warehouse prices or more freight. The 
problem of higher cost falls into three categories:
(a) goods which in fact either do not (or at least 
should not) cost more which includes items which 
the member state in question exports to third 
countries and for which it is, therefore, 
apparently a competitive source of supply, as 
well as commodities for which there are 
significant transport economies (e.g. Zimbabwe 
sugar and cement in much of B o t s w a n a ) ;
(b) goods which could be competitive if the exporter 
priced at marginal cost - the normal global 
export pricing approach - not at the protected 
domestic wholesale price and/or which could 
become competitive in price were the factories in 
question to operate at or near capacity (e.g. by 
winning regional export or d e r s ) ;
(c) goods for which regional sources really are more 
expensive than third country supplies (including 
South A f r i c a ) .
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The problem in the first two categories relate to knowledge 
(including how to price for export) and, often, an inferiority 
complex (carefully nurtured by foreign suppliers, their local 
representatives and some vocal proponents of economic cooperation 
who never fail to add "of course the imports will cost more".)
The third category is rather different. Here the problem is that 
SADCC states do not yet view regional trade as in any sense like 
domestic trade - in which protection for local production (by 
tariff or exchange control or other means) is quite normally 
considered if imports threaten local production. While it is 
quite reasonable to consider costs (in terms of domestic 
protection as well as of regional purchases) and to give special 
consideration to domestic producers, economic coordination in 
trade (and the development of each SADCC member's regional 
exports) cannot be based purely on the general application of 
least cost sourcing any more than a coherent domestic 
manufacturing sector can be developed on the rigorous application 
of free trade p r i n c i p l e s .
34. Credit for exports/exporters is often inadequate within 
SADCC both relative to domestic trade and to credit available to 
the exporters of third countries (including South Africa).
Exports - especially in the SADCC context - are likely to have a 
longer period between dispatch and receipt of payment than 
domestic sales and, therefore, to require either additional 
overdraft facilities or special term credit - neither of which is 
always readily obtainable. In addition, many exporters provide 
short to medium term (six months to five years) export credit to 
allow lower export prices and/or higher exporter profits (if the
credit is to the exporter) or more attractive terms (if the
credit is to the p u r c h a s e r ) . This is particularly likely to be
critical in respect to capital goods, e.g. railway rolling stock 
from Zimbabwe, electrical transformers and switchgear from 
Tanzania. No SADCC state has a full fledged scheme of this type.
35. Import licensing affects intra-SADCC trade in two respects. 
First it increases uncertainty - to interest a customer and to 
secure his applying for a permit to import by no means guarantees 
that an actual order will be forthcoming and when. This is a 
considerable disincentive to seeking regional sales - both 
domestic orders and - where relevant - those from convertible 
currency markets are less uncertain as to the completion of a 
formal order and as to its date. Second - and perhaps less
obvious - is the way in which raw material, spares and related
import licenses to producers are usually allocated. Rarely are 
they divided into inputs for l o a d  production and inputs allowed 
on the basis that the resulting goods are to be exported. A firm 
winning substantial regional export orders is not - under present 
import licensing procedures - likely to be able (or at least to 
be able promptly) to secure augmented import allocations to meet 
it. Because export prices are often below domestic and because 
most factories can (under current circumstances) sell all they 
can produce at home, the absence of special import licensing 
procedures and allocations for export production is a severe 
disincentive to producers' considering exporting and encourages 
sticking to the domestic market. A somewhat different form of 
this problem arises if import licenses for inputs are divided 
into those to produce for domestic use and those to produce for
19
hard currency exports, with goods produced for sale under 
regional trade arrangements not falling in either category as is 
apparently the case in one SADCC member state.
36. Export licensing can have similar results - especially in 
respect to causing delay and uncertainty. This is especially 
true if one criteria is "adequacy of supply to domestic market" 
which - taken literally - might prevent over half of existing 
intra-SADCC trade in manufactures. Another is export licensing 
procedures which may at the last moment shift consignments from 
SADCC bilateral trade agreement to extra-regional hard currency 
m a r k e t s .
37. Exchange control is a major barrier to the growth of 
intra-SADCC trade. The delay in making current account 
commercial payments (in some cases for over two years) is a major 
burden on any exporter and especially on a relatively financially 
weak exporter with no access to subsidised export credit or 
export payments risk insurance. This is especially true in those 
cases in which issuance of an import license does not (in 
practice and in some cases not even in principle) carry any 
guarantee of an early approval of remittance of payment for the 
goods following their arrival. An analagous problem exists in 
some cases in respect to payments for transport services with the 
funds tied up in blocked accounts. The cash flow problem to the 
seller is evident enough. However, a further cumulative problem 
arises even if payments are presently received. He has had to 
borrow money at interest pending receipt and does not receive any 
interest on delayed transfers. If the average delay is 12
20
months, the only way a seller can protect himself against the 
extra cost is to raise his initial selling price by 15 to 20% - 
with the predictable result of being seen as a "high cost 
sou r c e " .
38. Two barriers sometimes seen as primary obstacles to 
intra-SADCC trade are less important than is often supposed.
They do hinder trade but do not (in most cases) hinder SADCC 
imports more than those from third countries. These are import 
duties and non-convertible cur r e n c i e s .
39. Import duties do not discriminate against SADCC exporters 
relative to those of third countries unless the third countries 
enjoy lower tariffs. The only major case of this is that of the 
South African Customs Union members and even they can maintain 
free trade arrangements with Zimbabwe and Malawi (as successor 
states to the former Central African Fed e r a t i o n ) . Other minor 
cases may exist of preferential tariffs to third countries, but 
these are minor and could probably be corrected easily. What is 
true is that tariff preferences to SADCC members (whether 
bilaterally, on a multilateral SADCC basis or within the PTA) 
might be a useful (if secondary) means of facilitating trade.
40. Inconvertible currencies do not, by themselves, hamper 
trade. What does so is uncertainty as to import licensing and 
delays in clearing p a y m e n t . All SADCC currencies do have 
established parities (some admittedly pegged to floating baskets) 
and transactions fixed in terms of their (the SADCC currencies')
exchange ratio at the date of sale or of payment are perfectly
fea s i b l e . They are little used partly because of habit and lack 
of knowledge and partly because, in the absence of some effective 
balance settling procedure (clearing and remittance at central 
bank l e v e l ) , they have little attraction to enterprises. An 
effective balance settling procedure need not imply full 
convertibility (even on current account), nor need it be on a 
global basis applying to third countries, if its purpose is to 
facilitate regional coordination in energy, food, transport and 
manufacturing production and trade.
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V. First Steps to Barrier Dismantling
41. Outlining the nature of barriers is critical to deciding 
what to dismantle and how. However, it is not by itself a d e q u a t e . 
The knowledge barrier was identified in some detail by the 
Industrial Coordination officials meeting in April 1980; but 
without any very systematic or rapid progress toward dismantling 
this barrier to trade development. One reason has probably been 
the absence of any forum specifically charged with responsibility 
for trade develeopment. Energy, Industry, Agriculture and 
Transport ministers and officials are not - at domestic level - 
primarily responsible for, nor necessarily expert in, 
interpreting or discussing possible changes in trade and payments 
policy and practice. That responsibility and expertise lies 
basically with Ministers of Trade and of Finance and with Central 
B a n k s .
42. Knowledge is needed at several levels:
(a) major purchasers and producers need to know of 
each others' existence, product (to sell or to 
order) range and approximate prices;
(b) importers and exporters other than producers and 
ultimate users need to know who (import or export 
house and/or producer or user) in the other 
states sells (buys) which products of interest to 
them at what prices;
(c) governments need the same information - in a 
simplified form - for two reasons: to have a 
directory on their own buyers/sellers to transmit
to partners and similar directories from their 
partners to transmit to their own enterprises; 
and to be able (especially in states with import 
planning or export promotion) to facilitate 
managing increases in their participation in 
intra-SADCC trade. The first case is not as a 
substitute for direct contact among enterprises 
but rather as a means of facilitating it.
Similarly the means for building up operational bodies of mutual 
knowledge need to be multiple. Larger firms (producers, sellers 
or traders) should undertake commercial visits to other SADCC 
members. If they wish they should provide (via their trade 
ministry) data on their product and price interest range to the 
trade ministries of the states they are visiting and, in return, 
receive lists of potential customer or source enterprises in that 
country. Trade fairs are, at least for larger firms, probably 
inferior to preplanned visits by one or a few enterprises at a 
time but the two approaches may usefully be combined. Smaller 
enterprises either need to communicate electronically and by 
post, or (and) to nominate larger firms (particularly relevant 
importers and exporters) to act as their agents for buying and 
selling in other SADCC states. For them participation in trade 
fairs - if made financially feasible - may be valuable in 
developing contacts. None of this sounds very dramatic or novel 
- nor is it. But it is the way trade links (internationally or, 
for that matter, within a national market) are built up and by 
and large it is not now happening systematically within SADCC 
(with a limited number of enterprise and perhaps one national
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e x c eption). Chambers of Commerce (or of Trade) also have a role 
to play - e.g. through a formal or informal SADCC Association of 
C h a m b e r s .
43. Inferiority complex reduction about SADCC products can only 
be eroded by increasing user awareness that they are 
satisfactory. That requires that they do use them. This can be 
a vicious circle (as it can be for new national products in the 
domestic m a r k e t ) . Three possible ways forward are: "Buy national 
and SADCC" publicising and displaying good (and only good) 
p r o d u c t s ; use of government or other public sector purchases to 
help SADCC products gain initial entry; selective import control 
with at least part of the licenses limited to SADCC sources for 
products which are known to be available, reasonable in quality 
and acceptable in price.
44. Transport and communication gap removal and cost reduction 
falls basically within the ambit of S A T C C . However, more 
attention to ensuring that competent clearing and forwardings, 
cargo agency, insurance and related services are in fact 
available, competent and plausibly priced is needed and - to date 
- has not figured prominently on SATCC agendas. Whether trade or 
transport ministries should take the lead is a question to which 
the answer probably varies from state to state and even 
complementary service to complementary service. In practice 
governments have some leverage here. Many of these services in 
several SADCC states are at least partly provided by public 
sector enterprises and/or joint ventures who would have to be 
responsive to instructions/requests to devote their attention to
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acting competently in the regional trade sector. Even private 
firms would respond to moral persuasion especially in a context 
in which they saw intra-SADCC trade as likely to expand and 
therefore render this expansion of their service coverage (or 
quality) lucrative.
45. Cost needs to be tackled differently depending on the 
p r o d u c t :
(a) in a not insubstantial number of cases the 
products are priced competitively n o w ;
(b) in others full capacity use would reduce average 
cost to levels quite close to world market levels 
(e.g. Tanelec's switchgear and electrical 
distribution products now cost 30 to 50% Fob 
above European prices while the plant is 
operating at 25 - 30% of capacity. At capacity 
the cost differential would be under 10% Fob.
The cost pattern for the Zimbabwe plant - 
especially if it is modernised - may be similar);
(c) when a competitive price is below the exporters 
average but above his incremental cost, the fact 
that exporting quite regularly takes place at 
such prices and is profitable at any price above 
incremental cost if it increases output needs to 
be brought home to producers. Incremental cost 
as a pricing base is standard in world trade in 
competitive manufactures. Those with no history 
of exporting quite often do not understand this 
(nor indeed do government officials always
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recognise i t ) .
In the - by no means insubstantial - number of cases covered by 
approaches (a)-(b)-(c) the cost problem can be overcome by 
achieving a directly competitive p r i c e . But more than that 
probably is needed for rapid intra-SACC trade development. It is 
no use to suppose that all regional trade (any more than all 
national production) can be at prices equal to or lower than the 
most competitive third country sources. The justification for a 
higher price is basically that the economy is thereby achieving 
more production of goods and services because it is also selling 
goods and services to other SADCC st a t e s . This justification 
does not require exact balance to be valid. It does require that 
each SADCC state have significant sales as well as purchases 
(possibly largely sales of services and purchases of g o o d s ) .
There are a variety of means to giving preference to particular 
SADCC sourced products if it is seen as acceptable to pay some 
extra price in order to make possible sustained expansion of 
one's own production for intra-SADCC sale:
(a) preferential tariffs (whether within PTA or 
bilaterally);
(b) preferential government purchasing (i.e. 
preferential vis a vis third countries not vis a 
vis national p r o d u c t s ) ;
(c) import licenses for some goods (or some portion 
of the imports of some goods) valid only for 
specific SADCC members or SADCC sources in 
g e n e r a l ;
(d) in countries with some import licensing by
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product but also significant OGL (open general 
license) lists having an intermediate category 
ORL (open regional license) with SADCC sourced 
goods not needing a license but those from third 
countries requiring one;
(e) multiyear negotiated price (or price formula) 
contracts with minimum purchase and delivery 
c o m m i t m e n t s . Assuming that contracts in both 
directions (or goods contracts partly offsetting 
power and/or transport purchases) are made there 
is a common interest at national economy level 
and assuming the importer can pass on the cost 
(which may require interference of one variety or 
another with competing imports) the importing 
enterprise will be content with the contract;
(f) target trade agreements (perhaps in the longer 
term multi-member but initially overlapping 
bilateral ones among pairs of SADCC members) 
indicating (on the basis of knowledge not pure 
guesswork) approximate levels and prices of main 
commodities intended to implement the target and 
involving (formally or informally) known 
enterprise interest in and commitment to 
achieving these targets.
It is perfectly true that the GATT, several OECD member states, 
EEC and - especially - IMF will mutter about approaches (c) 
through (f). However, _i£ SADCC is convincingly seeking to build 
up regional economic integration and trade these mutterings are
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unlikely (judging by experience of other groupings) to be pushed 
to the point of serious "retaliatory" action. A high proportion 
of world trade already takes place under preferential purchasing 
arrangements and rules and as "compensation" or "barter" trade at 
private enterprises parastatal and government levels. N o n e , of 
the preferences and incentives listed above, it should be noted 
is dependent on public sector dominance of imports and exports 
nor of detailed import licensing (foreign exchange budgeting) for 
all imports. Such conditions would make operation of all 
simpler, but are neither necessary (nor - without an operational 
commitment to using intra-SADCC trade to build up national and 
regional production - even sufficient) conditions.
46. Credit for export transactions up to 365 days (to the 
exporter) should not pose major difficulties for normal 
commercial banks _if some clearing or settlement mechanism to 
ensure that there is not an indefinite delay in the exporters' 
receiving effective payment exists. (If no such arrangement 
exists, the commercial bank and/or the exporter does need 
insurance against that risk. As the only body with much leverage 
in securing remittances, the logical issue of such insurance is a 
Central Bank.) Longer term credit at subsidised rates (e.g. 5%, 
18 months grace, 42 months to pay) poses far greater problems.
It may be possible for specific products whose regional sales 
would be net production gains and for which either the producing 
enterprise (or a government owning it) can afford the lagged cash 
flow. Crude oil may be an example. Otherwise it probably 
requires soft external finance to provide the credit. One 
plausible source is for SADCC to seek to have intra-SADCC goods
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make eligible for purchases from aid grants or c r e d i t s . This is 
of course already the case - at least in principle - in respect 
to purchases for EEC financed projects when both buyer and seller 
are ACP states and - with greater limitations - in respect to 
some Scandinavian and USAID funding. It is also true in respect 
to World Bank and ADB tenders. The most striking examples relate 
to Zimbabwean maize via multilateral and bilateral food aid. 
Broadening the coverage and loosening the restrictions on 
"intra-SADCC third country procurement" will not be easy but i_f 
SADCC finance ministers make a coordinated push for it in
negotiating aid agreements there should be some results. Trying
to get outside funding for a substantial SADCC export credit 
agency seems less likely to be successful and - if it were - 
might well simply divert funds from other sectors (e.g. transport
and communication) which is much less likely if the "third|
country procurement" route is pursued. However, an "import 
content support fund" to cover the extra regional content of 
intra regional exports is worth exploration. It could be tied to 
bilateral mutual credit agreements (with or without a fuller 
frame trade agreement) so that the exporting country could 
receive from the fund a proportion -say 25% - of its exports to 
the other SADCC member. The EEC and Norway are among the
co-operating states and agencies which have shown signs of being
prepared to help finance such a fund.
47. Import licensing can be a positive factor in respect to 
intra-SADCC trade _if the following conditions can be met:
(a) licenses (forex allocations) are made well in 
advance to allow buyer and seller forward
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p l a n n i n g ;
(b) licenses - at least in respect to intra-SADCC 
trade - carry a guarantee (in practice not only 
on paper) that at the end of the agreed 
commercial credit period (whether 90 or 180 days 
after shipment or arrival) the funds will be 
available to the exporter in his own currency 
(whether by remittance or an intra-Central Bank 
clearing/swing credit arrangement);
(c) licenses are at least as readily available for 
SADCC sourced as for third country imports a n d , 
preferably, are used to give preferential a c c e s s ;
(d) exports result in higher import licenses (forex 
allocation) to exporting enterprises either by 
specific extra allocations to import inputs for 
export production or by allowing some per cent 
(say 25%) for most manufacturing enterprises of 
export earnings to be added to the firm's basic 
forex (import license) allocation in the 
licensing period after the exports are achieved.
In practice several SADCC states have import licensing and export 
incentive (or non-incentive) practices which to a greater or less 
degree fall short on most (or all) of the criteria.
48. Export licensing procedure needs review to identify what 
purposes are being served and what type of export licensing, if 
any, is needed to further them. For example, if the purposes are
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availability of goods for the domestic market and for known 
exports for hard currency, then a system allowing quarterly 
licenses to enterprises could be set:
(a) on the basis of projected output less domestic 
and third country export allocation
(b) or on the basis of certification (by the 
enterprise) that it had met domestic and third 
country delivery targets and could export 
regionally out of the balance.
The first approach is simpler - a matter of some importance as 
complex, slow systems create delay and uncertainty which are 
highly trade deterring for manufacturers, exporters, importers 
and users.
49. Several of the problems turn on customs - transit traffic 
and related d o c u m e ntation. These should, to the maximum extent 
possible be:
(a) reduced in quantity - by having required data for 
as many purposes as possible entered on one form 
prepared in duplicate for those (e.g. Customs, 
Treasury, Trade, Central Bank) requiring copies;
(b) simplification of forms to make them intelligible 
(to the enterprise completing and to the 
recipient agencies) and to eliminate provision of 
data nobody u s e s ;
(c) simplification of procedures to speed up transit 
and import trade and to facilitate whatever 
valuation is needed while still protecting the 
revenue (and domestic producers) e.g. for transit
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traffic by simple sealed container, lorry and 
rail wagon methods;
(d) standardisation of forms and procedures to avoid 
repetition and confusion which is inevitable if - 
say - Tanzanian, Mozambican, Malawian, Zambian 
and Zimbabwean documentation and procedures vary 
markedly (as in some respects they do) .
Ongoing efforts to achieve these ends supported by the UNCTAD 
financed regional unit based in Blantyre could provide a starting 
point for joint action by SADCC Customs Departments acting 
together with their Ministries of Finance and of Trade and their 
Central Banks and after consultation with user enterprises 
(producers, traders, transporters, clearers and forwarders) to 
determine what problems users had with existing documentation and 
p ro c e d u r e s .
50. Exchange control is a problem because (to the extent that) 
payments are not made on time even when import licenses had been 
issued and the goods shipped in normal 90 or 180 day commercial 
credit. For an exporting enterprise (including an exporter of 
transport services) the cash flow and cost results (as discussed 
earlier) are disastrous. A number of alternative approaches 
could in principle be taken to this problem:
(a) general clearing of all commercial arrears and
then keeping such payments up to date for all 
sources including SADC ones (unfortunately quite
beyond the present or medium term capacity of
several SADCC m e m b e r s ) ;
(b) agreed phased clearing of intra-SADCC arrears
33
(i.e. as a priority within any global arrears 
reduction strategy) and immediate institution of 
prompt payment on new imports (of goods or 
services) following the effective beginning date 
of such "arrears elimination phasing" agreement 
(possible albeit only with a fairly long rundown 
of backlog period for certain states but 
bedevilled by the fact that third country arrears 
claimants are economically stronger, more 
influential with sources of external finance and 
less sympathetic to the arrears o w e r s 1 problems 
than fellow SADCC st a t e s ) ;
(c) setting up clearing procedures on a SADCC wide 
basis to cover all current transactions (along
the lines of the PTA's cleaning agreement - or if
,1
I!all SADCC states were to join the PTA by using 
that mechanism rather than a separate SADCC o n e ) ;
(d) negotiating target payments flows (covering 
energy, food, manufactures, transport services 
together) with:
(i) provisional monthly payments if the 
agreed target was an unbalanced one 
(likely for a coastal state/landlocked 
state agreement);
(ii) exporters' Central Bank to pay him when 
commercial credit due to date arrived and 
debit account of importers' Central Bank;
(iii) agreed mutual swing credit levels (for 
trade in goods and services between them
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only) by each Central Bank to the other;
(iv) a procedure which resulted in
rectification of imbalances beyond 
projections before the swing credits were 
exhausted and frozen (whether by hard 
currency remittances by debtor or stepped 
up imports by c r e ditor).
Implicitly both (c) and (d) assume that the arrears problem would 
be handled separately. A line would be drawn, new transactions 
kept current and ways to reduce the old backlog explored. The 
problem with the last approach is not one of principle, nor with 
the usefulness of mutual swing credits, but of practice - 
imbalances (for whatever reason) have tended to be above planned 
levels, discussions on how to reduce credit overhangs less than 
fully effective and "solutions" largely by the debtor buying less 
and creditor selling less (balance by trade destruction rather 
than trade e x p a nsion). It is useless to seek a technically 
failsafe clearing approach because the underlying problems are 
substantive:
(a) the external balance position of a majority of 
SADCC members is very weak - it is hard to pay 
anybody in time and almost harder to give any 
export market substantial credit;
(b) for whatever reasons, Central Banks, trade 
ministries and treasuries have been unwilling or 
unable to give preferential (or in some cases 
even general most favoured nation) treatment in 
keeping payments current, in arrears reduction or 
in balance solving by trade expansion to their
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SADCC partners.
No institutional arrangement in and of itself can "solve" these 
problems which turn on financial capacity and priorities in forex 
use, exportables allocation by destination and import sourcing.
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V I . Toward Frame A g r eements?
51. The Lusaka Declaration cites bilateral frame trade 
agreements as a positive way of taking initial steps toward 
intra-SADCC trade expansion. The example cited,
Mozambique-Tanzania, happens to cover basically manufactures but 
for a case in which intertrade in energy, transport services or 
food is significant (as it has usually not been in the 
Mozambique-Tanzania case) these could be logically covered as 
w e l l .
52. This approach can be described as "balanced" or 
"compensation" or "barter" trade. The last is somewhat 
misleading as prices and selection of products are involved not a 
strict exchange of quantities of goods for quantities of goods 
with neither prices nor flexibility. "Balanced" and 
"compensation" trade are now very common - by some estimates 
accounting for well over 25% of global trade. They are not 
unique to the state trading economies of central and eastern 
Europe and Asia. Recent examples include oil exporters in 
respect to their dealings with, e.g. France and Scandinavian 
states. The volume of such trade is often underestimated because 
in the industrial capitalist countries the partner is usually an 
enterprise which agrees to purchase (usually for resale) a value 
of goods equal to all or a proportion of the value of the exports 
it is selling. A number of specialist firms (and departments of 
major trading firms such as those of Japan) have sprung up to 
handle the resale side. It is more efficient if the 
compensation/balancing aspects can be at national level as then
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purchasers can be enterprises really wanting to use, or trade in, 
the imports and not exporters accepting products with whose sale 
they have no experience in order to close a deal.
53. Bilateral agreements - as illustrated by the substantial 
number which now exist among pairs of SADCC members - vary widely 
in precise f o r m . They also (and less satisfactorily) vary widely 
in apparent effectiveness. A review of the present agreements 
evaluating results both against pre-agreement trade and against 
expectations/targets, followed by consideration of what 
approaches or elements seemed to be most/least effective and why, 
would appear to be desirable if the bilateral frame agreement 
approach is to be used more widely and effectively in the future.
54. However, a number of elements likely to be conducive to an 
effective agreement can be identified:
(a) coverage of all major transactions not simply 
visible trade or trade in manufactures;
(b) agreed target levels of trade in each direction - 
not necessarily balance;
(c) sub-targets by main service or product with rough 
quantity and unit value goals;
(d) adequate data to make (c) a serious projection 
exercise not one in guessing or crystal ball 
gaz in g ;
(e) direct or indirect association of major 
enterprises whose actual production (and its 
allocation among domestic, SADCC and third 
country markets) and sourcing of purchases would
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be critical to whether the actual outcome roughly 
corresponded to the target with the formulation 
of targets and the process of executing them;
(f) use of mutual credits handled via Cental Bank 
accounts to facilitate initial trade flows and to 
ensure that exporters receive prompt payment in 
their own currency;
(g) building in monthly initial payments (if the 
target is for an imbalance of a significant 
a mount), swing credits and prompt mechanisms for 
agreeing on how to overcome divergences of 
actuals from projections before they swamp the 
agr e e m e n t ;
(h) consideration of multi-year contracts (with price 
formulas and agreed minimum order and supply 
levels) for new industries agreed within the 
SADCC Industrial Coordination context to become 
part of the baseline data for successive annual 
frame trade agreements.
55. None of these elements requires state trading nor 
comprehensive import licensing. Admittedly the latter - and 
perhaps the former - make the likelihood of being able to hold 
actuals in fairly close relation to targets more likely. The 
point is that even assuming limited import licensing and 
basically private importers and exporters, use of the incentives 
discussed in para 45 above could significantly manage/influence 
trade toward the targeted levels.
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V I I . Notes Toward an Action Check List
56. SADCC trade development cannot be fully discussed, let alone 
cast in the form of a strategic plan, least of all articulated 
into a package of workable policies at one meeting.
57. Therefore, if it is decided to pursue a coordinated action 
programme in respect to trade there are certain procedural 
requirements:
(a) a regular (perhaps twice a year) series of 
official level and probably (once a year) of 
ministerial m e e t i n g s ;
(b) an ongoing exchange of information;
(c) bilateral negotiation/implementation as a 
significant means of putting the coordinated 
trade development approach into practice;
(d) specialist meetings - e.g. on documentation 
simplification and standardisation - when 
necessary to achieve specific targets;
(e) a coordinating country to facilitate information 
exchange, arrange background data and basic 
papers/agendas for the meetings, be responsible 
for seeing that agreed studies were done (whether 
by the coordinating country's own personnel, a 
permanent technical assistance person in the 
coordinating country or on a one off 
c o n s u ltancy).
58. However, that is in a sense putting the plough in front of
40
the ox - there is a need for a set of procedures and meetings 
only if there is an agreed list of things to be done which are 
seen as both possible in themselves and likely to stimulate the 
development of nationally and regionally beneficial expansion of 
intra-SADCC tr a d e .
59. A possible check list of items for coordination national 
action includes:
(a) creating government level information exchange 
including directories of products and 
enterprises, as suggested under knowledge 
development in para 41;
(b) encouraging producers/users/international traders 
to look to (at) SADCC markets and sources and 
perhaps subsidising their initial trips, 
including to trade fairs, to develop market 
c o n t a c t s ;
(c) reviewing the adequacy of bank credit available 
to exporters and seeking to negotiate wide "third 
party procurement" eligibility for SADCC state 
products in aid agreements as discussed at para 
46;
(d) give serious consideration to holding national 
seminars (primarily for enterprise management but 
also for relevant officials) on building up 
exports (including principles of export p ricing) 
possibly making use of Finnish and UNCTAD/GATT 
International Trade Centre expertise;
(e) review import and export licensing with a view to
making it at least neutral between SADCC and 
third country sources and to providing forex 
availability incentives to enterprises which 
build up SADCC market (and for that matter other 
non traditional) exports as discussed at paras 35 
and 46;
review the availability, adequacy and cost of 
clearing and forwarding, shipping agency and 
insurance services for intra-SADCC trade in close 
consultation with S A T C C ;
create a specialist sub-committee to explore 
alternatives in respect to payments/clearing 
arrangements (as discussed at paras 40 and 50 
above) and report back to the next official 
meeting with proposals;
work toward a specialist meeting of Customs 
officials to seek simplification and 
standardisation of documentation following 
consultation with affected enterprises and 
national determination (by Customs, Treasury, 
Trade, Central Bank, etc.) of practicable steps 
(as discussed at para 49 ab o v e ) ; 
review the results, strengths and weaknesses of 
exiting "bilateral frame agreements" (see Section 
VI) with a view to presenting a paper to the next 
meeting on how such agreements might be made more 
effective and on what their potential as a trade 
development mechanism is likely to be in the 
SADCC context;
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(j) explore the possibility of securing external
£ inance for an " import content support fund" to 
facilitate regional trade expansion (as discussed 
at para 46 a b o v e ) .
60. The first six areas would require national action - 
preferably with brief notes on results tabled at the next meeting 
either by each member state or in a consolidated form by the 
coordinating state on the basis of the national submissions. The 
seventh requires a specialist (presumably Central Bank or Central 
Bank/Treasury) subcommittee to meet on the basis of terms of 
reference set by the ministers and a set of papers on alternative 
approaches. While the eighth calls for national reviews leading 
to a specialist m e e t i n g . The first stage of the ninth topic 
would be national r e v i e w s , a comparative evaluation and a set of 
suggestions would require that the coordinating state (or a 
consultant chosen by it) visit each member state to secure its 
study and discuss it with its compilers and then prepare the 
overall r e p o r t . The last topic requires pursuing inquiries by 
the coordinating state in cooperation with the Secretariat and 
Ministerial C h a i r m a n .
61. None of the proposals above appears to conflict in principle 
with the goals or requirements of the Preferential Trade Area as 
they apply to its members during its multi-year initial period. 
Most relate to topics or instruments which either do not feature 
in the PTA Treaty or on which no action is in hand or likely to 
begin soon. More critical from a SADCC perspective - PTA is not 
at present a practicable instrumentality for coordinating
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intra-SADCC trade development because four SADCC members are not 
PTA m e m b e r s . To use PTA as the sole means of regional trade 
promotion would be to exclude virtually half SADCC's members from 
that process. The proposals of this paper are based on the goals 
embodied in the Lusaka Declaration and its specification of 
intra-SADCC trade as an important means of working toward those 
goals by co-ordinated action involving all SADCC member s t a t e s .
AAnnex
i.
i i .
SADCC-PTA Complementarities and Differences
There are two main regional intergovernmental organisations 
concerned with trade devlopment in the Southern African 
region: SADCC and the Preferential Trade Area of Eastern 
and Southern A f r i c a . However, while they are overlapping 
in area and in membership they are not identical in either. 
SADCC is geographically bounded by Southern Africa and 
includes all nine independent st a t e s . PTA's geographic 
zone is Eastern and Southern Africa (including the Indian 
Ocean states) and has 22 potential members of whom slightly 
over half have ratified the PTA Treaty. Four SADCC members 
are not while five are PTA members at present. Therefore, 
neither geographically nor in terms of membership are SADCC 
and PTA alternatives. It is not possible to promote trade 
development in the SADCC region solely via PTA because to 
do so would exclude four SADCC m e m b e r s .
SADCC and PTA do not have the same primary goals and 
ap p r o a c h e s :
a. SADCC is based on coordination of production, 
information and research to achieve economic 
security, employment, development oriented to the 
basic needs of its peoples and reduction of 
dependence, especially on South Africa. Trade is 
important as a means to assist in realizing these 
g o a l s ;
b. PTA is based on the reduction of barriers 
(customs, licensing, documentation, etc.) to 
trade and the promotion of supporting devices to 
facilitate it (e.g clearing arrangements). For 
it trade is central and other sectors are means 
to promote it.
Predictably, therefore, SADCC and PTA do not propose to use 
identical toolkits of measures to promote and manage trade 
and, do not lay the same emphasis on those which are common 
to b o t h , e.g.:
Ba. SADCC - in the Lusaka Declaration has identified 
bilateral frame agreements as a major element in 
building a regional trade system whereas they are 
absent from PTA's approach (though they are 
present in the Lagos Plan of Action of the O A U ) ;
b. PTA has placed primary emphasis on multilateral
tariff preferences among all members whereas in 
SADCC bilateral tariff preferences among certain 
pairs of members are of varying importance and 
are not, in general, central to preferential 
trade development;
c. SADCC has placed more stress on enterprise 
exchange of information and contacts (backed by 
Trade Ministry coordination and inter-change of 
data) to date than has PTA although this might 
not be a permanent difference in emphasis;
d. PTA, like most common market/free trade area
bodies has opted for a detailed treaty, a strong 
secretariat and limited direct involvement of 
government in organisational programmes whereas 
SADCC has opted for a broad initial compact 
identifying common goals and interests with 
subsequent operational agreements as the need 
arises, a limited secretariat and maximum member 
state involvement.
These difference are significant. They arise out of the 
different natures of the two bodies. It is quite possible 
that each body has made the correct choice of emphasis, of 
policy tools and of organisation given its own geographic 
scope and primary focus. Certainly one must assume that 
the member states of each believe these choices to be 
c o r r e c t .
iv. In principle no conflict exists between the goals and
approaches of SADCC and of PTA. This is certainly true as 
to goals. In respect to the PTA treaty it applies to 
approaches at least in respect to the initial transitional 
period. That period is scheduled to last for several more
cyears and - from precedents in other trade areas - may well 
be extended. Even after that period fairly minor 
amendments to the treaty would avoid any conflict with the 
SADCC programme. As the PTA is the creature, not the 
master, of its members of whom five (and potentially nine) 
are SADCC members, there seems no reason such amendments 
(e.g. as to what constitutes parallel treatment in respect 
to bilateral trade agreements and multiyear contracts) 
would be difficult to secure. SADCC explicitly endorses 
the concept of member state participation in other economic 
co-ordination arrangements with non-SADCC member 
neighbours. This is, of course, totally consistent with 
the Lagos Plan of Action which envisages a network of 
sub-regional arrangements as the building blocks toward 
Pan-African economic coordination. The conclusion of basic 
complementarity, not conflict, is not new. The United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (while serving as 
interim PTA Secretariat) confirmed absence of conflict in a 
letter to the then SADCC Ministerial Vice Chairman and the 
SADCC Council of Ministers reached the same conclusion on 
the basis of a technical memorandum considered at its 1983 
Dar es Salaam Council Meeting.
v. Questions of actual or potential overlap are harder to 
answer definitely. Most of the SADCC trade development 
proposals are not on the present PTA a g e n d a . The evident 
exception is tariff p r e f erences, however, those operational 
or proposed within SADCC are both bilateral (not 
multilateral) and much more sweeping than any currently 
contemplated by PTA for the next several years. 
Documentation simplification work has, in fact, been 
coordinated not by PTA but by an UNCTAD financed technical 
unit for three clusters of countries involving SADCC and 
PTA members and countries which are members of neither. In 
terms of present ongoing activities of PTA there appears to 
be no overlap at all with the main areas of activity 
envisaged for a SADCC programme of intra-SADCC trade 
development. The sectors in which overlap - at least at 
the level of formal stated programmes - exist are transport
Dand c o m m u nication, where PTA's agenda (albeit not its work 
to date) would appear in large part to duplicate SATCC's, 
and industrial coordination. This is unfortunate as there 
is plenty of room for non-overlapping complementary 
programmes (e.g involving the northern PTA members, Indian 
ocean shipping and routes between SADCC members and 
Kenya-Uganda-Rwanda-Burundi-Zaire for PTA in transport and 
communications) but it does not directly involve S A D C C 1s 
proposed trade development sectoral pr o g r a m m e .
vi. In practice, the main potential overlaps and divergences 
betwen programmes and instruments within SADCC and the PTA 
treaty already exist quite independent of a SADCC trade 
development s e c t o r . These include:
a. actual or potential bilateral major preferential 
or free trade arrangements between, e.g. Zimbabwe 
and Botswana, Malawi and Zimbabwe and Tanzania 
and Mozambique;
b. bilateral trade agreements with targets and main 
product lists among inter alia Zimbabwe and 
Tanzania, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, Tanzania and 
Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania.
Quite clearly both of these routes are developing and will 
develop within SADCC. Member states clearly intend to use 
them and have a sovereign right to do s o . The question is 
not a theoretical one as to their formal coherence with PTA 
but rather whether their development in the context of a 
co-ordinated SADCC trade development sector would be 
speedier and more eff i c i e n t .
vii. In summary:
a. there is no conflict in principle or as to goals 
between SADCC and PTA;
b. PTA, because four SADCC states are not members, 
is not a substitute for a SADCC trade development 
se c t o r ;
c. major overlap should be relatively easy to a v o i d ; 
it is not apparent on the initial steps proposed
within PTA and SADCC;
PTA can do certain things better than SADCC -
e.g. arrange preferential tariffs over a broad 
geographic area - and undertake certain tasks 
SADCC probably cannot - e.g. transport and 
communications coordination between SADCC states 
and the northern PTA area as well as Indian Ocean 
shipping or, to be precise, it can do so _if all 
or almost all of its 22 potential members 
eventually do join;
in certain areas practical technical cooperation 
may be d e s i r a b l e , e.g. documentation 
simplification to have maximum value should 
involve Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda (PTA members) and 
Burundi (to date not a member) as well as the 
nine SADCC members;
The Council of Ministers may wish at some point 
to instruct the SADCC Trade Development Sector 
Coordinating State to talk with the PTA 
Secretariat to exchange information on concrete 
programmes and to identify specific technical 
areas in which cooperative or joint action might 
be useful;
SADCC member states may wish to discuss - in 
respect to all sectors covered by the Lusaka 
Programme of Action, not just trade - how to 
avoid conflict, minimize overlap and maximize 
complementarity (possibly on occasion including 
joint technical programmes or consultations) 
between SADCC and PTA. Agreed proposals could 
then be acted on within PTA meetings by the five 
SADCC members who are also members of PTA.
